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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT,
Deceased
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY and
VILATE P. DEVINE,
Appellants,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9022

MARGUERITE GESSFORD
PIERPONT and
ELLA P. MEYER
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Thomas Fairclough Pierpont, hereafter called testator, died testate on September 14, 1954, in Provo, Utah.
The testator's will was, on October 22, 1954, admitted
to probate in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and
for the County of Utah and Tracy-Collins Trust Company was duly appointed as executor (R. pp. 29, 467).
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On October 2, 1957, the executor filed its second and
final account and report, petition for confirmation of
agreement, petition for construction of will and petition
for final distribution. The hearing on this petition was
held on October 18, 1957, and timely legal notice thereof
was given to all interested parties. The petition was
granted insofar as it requested final distribution of the
estate and by an order effective as of October 18 1957
'
'
the residue of the estate was distributed to Tracy-Collins
Trust Company as trustee (hereinafter called trustee)
for the use and benefit of certain persons named in the
will (R. p. 467).
As the result of a demand made by the attorney for
Mrs. Ella P. Meyer that the monthly payments be made
for the period commencing with the testator's death, said
petition also requested the probate court to interpret the
meaning of subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the Will*
and to make an order directing the trustee as to the date
from which payments to ]\frs. Pierpont and Mrs. Meyer
should be made. On October 25, 1957, the probate court,
after a hearing in which 1frs. Meyer's counsel participated, ruled in a minute entry that the bequests in subparagraph SEVENTH (i) "are in the nature of annui"(i) From the income of the Trust Es~ate and, if ins~~icient,
from the principal thereof, my Trustee, subJect to the provisions .of
subparagraph (k) of this Paragraph SEVENTH, shall make disbursements as follows:
(1) To my wife MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT, subject to
the provisions of Paragraph EIGHTH of this Wil~, the sum. of 'fwo
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month durmg her lifetime,
PROVIDED EXPRESSLY that if she shall remarry such payments shall cease upon her remarriage; and
(2) Tc1 my sister ELLA P. MEYER the sum of One Hundred Dollars
($100.00) per month during her lifetime."

"'
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ties" and as such commenced at testator's death. The
minute entry also ruled that the matter was controlled by
Section 74-3-14, U. C. A.1953 and that the bequest to Mrs.
Pierpont was in addition to the family allowance provided
for her by paragraph SIXTH* (R. p. 468). Thereafter,
the trustee filed a petition and an amended petition for
rehearing the petition for construction of will and for reconsideration and cancellation of the minute entry to
which respondents filed answers and amended answers
(R. p. 468). The court granted the trustee's petition for
rehearing, as amended, and such rehearing was had on
June 30, 1958. Timely notice of this hearing was given
to all heirs-at-law, legatees and devisees of the testator
and all of the beneficiaries under the trust (R. p. 469).
All the trust beneficiaries except John B. Pierpont
appeared either personally or through a duly appointed
guardian ad litem and all of said beneficiaries except
respondents joined in the trustee's petition for rehearing
as amended (R. p. 469). John B. Pierpont had not been
found at the time of the hearing but a citation and summons had been duly served upon him by publication in
the Daily Herald, a newspaper published in Provo, Utah
(R. p. 373). John B. Pierpont later joined in the trustee's
petition for rehearing as amended (R. p. 390).
After argument at the rehearing the court took the
matter under advisement and in a second minute entry

*

"SIXTH: It is my desire that my Executor shall cause provision
to be made for the payment to my wife, MARGUERITE GESSFORD
PIERPONT, of a family allowance of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
DOLLARS ($250.00) per month from the date of my death until
such time as my residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, as
provided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof."

3
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dated September 24, 1958, adhered to its prior ruling
(R. p. 463).
Thereafter the court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law which included findings that the provisions made by said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the
testator's will were in the nature of annuities and controlled by Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953; that the monthly
payments should commence September 14, 1954, the date
of death of the testator; that the will became effective as
of the date of death of the testator and the trust proYisions became effective as of that date; and that there
was nothing in the will to indicate the testator intended
to postpone the payments provided for in subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) of the will until the estate was distributed
to the trustee (R. pp. 460-466).
The court concluded and decreed that respondent
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont was entitled to the sum of
$9,282.88 representing monthly payments from September 14, 1954, to October 18, 1957, the date on which the
residue of the estate vvas distributed to the trustee together with interest on said $250.00 payments found to
be due her ''from the dates that they became due at the
rate of six per cent per annum.'' This amount was
decreed to be in, addition to the sum of $8,750.00 representing the family allowance paid to the widow during
probate and as to ·which there is no question. The court
further concluded and decreed that Ella P.

~:!eyer

was

Pntitled to the sum of $3,713.16 representing monthly
pnyments found to be due her under said will provision
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~e
~

from September 14, 1954, to October 18, 1957, "together
with interest on said $100.00 payments * * * from the
dates that they became due at the rate of six per cent per
annum.''
The trustee and Vila te P. DeVine, one of the beneficiaries under the trust, duly appealed from said decree
(R. p. 473).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(a) Circumstarnces under which the will was executed :

Respondent Marguerite Gessford Pierpont is the
widow of the testator. Mrs. Pierpont was many years
younger than the testator and married him when he was
at an advanced age (R. p. 370). Prior to the marriage
the widow was employed by the testator as his private
secretary (R. p. 370). The widow and the testator were
married on January 17, 1951, so that at the date of testator's death on September 14, 1954, they had been married less than four years. Respondent Ella P. Meyer is
the sister of the testa tor ( R. p. 14).
The testator left the five following surviving children
born of another marriage: Naomi P. Petit, Vilate P.
DeVine, Thomas G. Pierpont, Ruth P. Eccles and John B.
Pierpont who are residual beneficiaries under the testamentary trust (R. p. 16). Two of the decedent's children
born of said other marriage, Clifford S. Pierpont and
Margaret Pierpont Gardner, predeceased the testator and
the children of said Clifford S. Pierpont: Clifford S. Pier-

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pont, Jr., Smoot S. Pierpont and George S. Pierpont;
and the children of said Margaret Pierpont Gardner:
Reed P. Gardner, David P. Gardner and Vilate Gardner
constitute the remaining residual beneficiaries under the
testamentary trust (R. p. 16).
In addition to the above-named grandchildren, the
testator left surviving him the following named ten
grandchildren: Thomas P. Petit, Richard P. Petit, Diana
D. Felt, Thomas C. Pierpont, Kay Pierpont, Susan
Eccles, Barbara E. Co it, Dennis B. Pierpont, John B.
Pierpont, Jr., and Cherie Pierpont. (R. p. 71-72) All the
testator's grandchildren are beneficiaries under subparagraph SEVENTH (j) (1). The above-named living children of the testator, in addition to being residual beneficiaries under the trust are also direct beneficiaries under
subparagraph SEVENTH (i) (2).
(b) Nature of testator's estate:

The inventory and appraisement shows that the
value of testator's gross estate at death was $325,443.91
(R. pp. 128-134). This included:
(i) Stock in corporations valued at ________ $304,034.06
(ii) Vivian Park home valued at____________

7,200.00

(iii) Automobile valued at -----------------------(iv) Accounts receivable valued at__________

1,900.00
11,550.99

(Later in the first account (R. p.
300) an additional account receivable for $3,524.00 was added
6
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making total accounts receivable
of $15,074.99.)
(v) Furniture valued at ---------------------·---(vi) Cash of only------------------------------------------

750.00
8.86
$325,443.91

In addition to the above property the state inheritance tax report (R. p. 172) included the following jointly
owned property which vested in the widow at testator's
death:
(i) Cash in joint checking account_ ___________ $ 240.23
(ii) Vivian Park real property__________________
200.00
(iii) Provo Shakespeare A venue home._____ 12,000.00
$12,440.23
An analysis of the first and second accounts filed
in connection with the administration of the testator's
estate appearing respectively at pages 208-213 and 297305 of the record shows that none of the property in the
estate produced any income during probate except that
interest of $244.75 was realized under the contract of sale
of the Vivian Park home reported in the second account
(R. p. 297). The other cash receipts reported in the two
accounts consisted of loans to the estate (totaling approximately $70,000.00; insurance payments and premium refunds; money received in the settlement of a law suit
and money received in the conversion of estate assets.
In this connection it should be noted that not until the
7
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receipt of the cash distribution from the Provo Foundry
and Machine Company on August 29, 1957, did the estate
have any liquid principal assets not needed to pay the
estate debts, taxes and expenses of administration (R.
p. 297).
The net residual estate distributed to the trustee,
after payment of expenses of administration, taxes and
specific bequests was $158,339.22. (R. p. 336)
(c) General con.ten.ts of will an.d manner estate disposed of:

After providing for the payment of debts, taxes and
expenses of administration in paragraph FIRST, the
testator disposed of his estate in the following manner:
Under paragraph SECOND the widow was given the
automobile and the furniture and equipment in both the
Provo City and Provo Canyon homes (R. p. 11).
Paragraph THIRD made seventeen specific bequests totaling $19,000.00 (R. pp. 11-12).
Paragraph FOURTH bequeathed a total of $5,000.00
to Tracy-Collins Trust Company in trust for the use and
benefit of John B. Pierpont and Thomas G. Pierpont
(R. p. 12).
Paragraph FIFTH provided that estate assets were
not to be sold unless the executor considered it could be
done at a fair and reasonable price, ''even though such
course may inYolve delay in the distribution to be made
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under this Will and in the settling of my estate.'' (R. p.
13) Subparagraph SEVENTH (k) similarly provides
that after distribution to it the trustee was not to sell
principal assets at a sacrifice in order to obtain funds to
make payments under the trust (R. p. 15). These provisions have important significance, hereafter commented
on, owing to the want of liquid assets and the composition
of the estate which consisted chiefly of stock in the Provo
Foundry and Machine Company, a company which was
organized, developed, controlled and managed by testator.
Paragraph SIXTH provided for the payment to the
widow of a family allowance of $250.00 per month ''from
the date of my death until such time as my residual estate
shall be distributed to my Trustee, as provided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof." (R. p. 13) Under this provision the widow received a total of $8,750.00 during probate as a family allowance (R. pp 212 and 300).
The residual estate was then bequeathed and devised in trust to appellant bank to be held and disposed
of in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
SEVENTH (R. pp. 13-16).
Paragraph EIGHTH provided an alternative
$20,000.00 bequest to the widow in lieu of all other bequests and devises given to her. (R. p. 17) The widow
declined to accept this alternative bequest.
Paragraphs NINTH through THIRTEENTH contain general provisions (R. p. 17), some of which hereafter will be discussed in more detail.
9
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i)
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE TO THE
TRUSTEE.

PoiNT II.
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT THE
TESTATOR INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UNTIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO
THE TRUSTEE.

PoiNT III.
THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH
SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE NOT ANNUITIES
AND ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

PoiNT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE AMOUNTS
DECREED TO BE DUE THEM.

10
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ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Preliminary to arguing the above points, appellants
emphasize four basic principles which, appellants submit,
govern this appeal:
First, the interpretation of trust provisions of a will
is inherently an equitable function of the court. No evidence was introduced at the hearings below and no questions of fact were tried or determined. The purported
''findings of fact'' made by the lower court were actually
conclusions since they were founded only on the lower
court's interpretation of the testator's will made without supporting evidence. These facts alter the usual
appellate rule that a lower court's decree will be sustained
if there is a reasonable basis for it, and impose on this
court the duty to interpret the will de novo according to
applicable law.
In Wright v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 Utah 338, 62
Pac. 317, 318 (Utah 1900) this court in commenting upon
the scope of review in cases where no evidence is introduced in the trial court stated in part:
''The trial court found that the verdict was not
a chance verdict, and it is claimed by respondent's
counsel that, as the affidavits are conflicting, this
finding is conclusive, and quotes, in support of this
contention, the cases of Nelson v. Southern Pac.
Co., 15 Utah, 328, 49 Pac. 644, and Mangum v.
Mining Co., 15 Utah, 551, 50 Pac. 834. These cases
have no application whatever to motions for a new
trial, and are applicable only to trials by jury, or
11
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by the court when a jury is not demanded. This
court has frequently held that, even on appeals in
equity cases, notwithstanding both questions of
law and fact are subject to review, the findings of
the trial court will not be set aside when the evidence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly
insufficient. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v.
South Ogden Land, Building & Improvement Co.
(Utah) 58 Pac. 846; Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah,
45, 57 Pac. 712; McCornick v. Mangum, 20 Utah,
17, 57 Pac. 428; Irrigation Co. v. Thomas, 19 Utah,
360, 57 Pac. 30; and numerous other cases cited in
foregoing decisions. All of these cases relate to
findings in trials on the merits, and the reason on
which they are based has no application whatever
to motions for new trials. In a trial on the merits
the witnesses are subject to cross-examination,
and, being in view of the trial judge or referee, he
has a better opportunity to judge of their credibility than the appellate court. On a motion for
a new trial supported and resisted, as in the case
at bar, on ex parte affidavits, those making the
affidavits are not subject to cross-examination,
and, not being before the trial judge, his opportunity to judge of their credibility and the weight of
their statements is no better than the appellate
court. In, all such cases, and in equity cases where
the evidence consists exclusively of depositions,
the rea.son upon, which the decisions quoted are
ba.sed fa.ils, a!tbd the ruJe established by them has
no application to su,ch cases. White v. Pease, 15
Utah, 170, 49 Pac. 416; State v. Halford, 18 Utah,
3, 54 Pac. 819; Saunders Y. Pacific Co., 15 Utah,
334, 49 Pac. 646." (Emphasis added)
Second, the meaning of the ·will is to be ascertained
''according to the intention of the testator'' ( § 74-2-1,
U. C. A. 1953).
12
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Third, such intention is to be determined ''from the
words of the will, taking into view the circumstances
under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations"(§ 74-2-2, U. C. A.1953).
Fourth, meaning is to be ascertained not only from
the will provisions in question but from all the will provisions ''construed in relation to each other, and, if possible, so as to form one consistent whole'' ( § 74-2-5,

U. C. A. 1953).

PorNT I.

THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i)
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE _
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF THB ESTATE TO THE
TRUSTEE.
The judgment appealed from is founded in large
part upon finding No. 7 (which is actually a conclusion)
that the trust provisions of the will became effective on
the date of testator's death. (R p. 464-465) The implication is that if the trust provisions became effective on
that date the payments under subparagraph SEVENTH (i) commenced then.
The question of the time when the trust provisions
became effective must be answered from an interpretation of the provisions of the will.
13
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There is no provision of the will that states or suggests that the trust provisions became effective at the
testator's death. On the other hand, there are a number
of will provisions which show a clear intention that the
trust provisions were to become operative only when the
residual estate was distributed to the trustee.
Note how explicitly the testator delineated between
the periods of probate and trust administration. Paragraph TvVELFTH appointed Tracy-Collins Trust Company as executor of testator's will. Paragraph SEVENTH designated the bank as trustee of the testamentary trust. Paragraph FIFTH contains instructions to
the executor about not selling assets at a sacrifice during
probate and prior to distribution while subparagraph
SEVENTH (k) contains similar instructions to the
trustee relative to the trust estate. In paragraph THIRTEENTH the testator expresses the -wish that the
executor and the trustee would consult "ith his son and
sons-in-law about matters relating to the administration and handling "of my estate or of said trust." These
provisions show an unmistakable intention that there
would be successive not simultaneous periods of administration by the executor and the trustee.
Note also the significant language of paragraph
SIXTH where the testator defines the period during
which the widow would receive the family allowance as
being "from the date of my death until such time as my
residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, as prov,ided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof.''' (R. p.13) (Em-
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phasis added) Paragraph SEVENTH, which immediately
follows, provides in part:
"I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal or
mixed, wheresoever situate, whereof I may be
seized or possessed, or to which I may in any manner be entitled, or in which I may be interested
at the time of my death, to TRACY-COLLINS
TRUST COMPANY, of Salt Lake City, Utah, as
Trustee, in trust, nevertheless, for the following
uses and purposes: * * * (R. p. 13)
These two paragraphs read together distinctly show
the testator intended that the distribution of the residual
estate to the trustee referred to in paragraph SIXTH
and the bequest and devise provided for in paragraph
SEVENTH were to occur simultaneously after pro bate
had been completed and the residual estate determined.
In other words, the distribution referred to in paragraph
SIXTH is synonymous with the devise and bequest in
paragraph SEVENTH. This interpretation is corroborated by the important difference in the language of
disposition used in paragraph SEVENTH and in paragraphs SECOND, THIRD and FOURTH.
Paragraph SECOND provides "I hereby give, grant,
devise and bequeath to my wife, MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT'' certain described personal property. (R. p. 11) In paragraph THIRD the testator made
seventeen specific bequests using the words "I hereby
give and bequeath.'' (R. p. 11) In subparagraph
FOURTH (a) the testator granted $2,500.00 to TracyCollins Trust Company in trust for his son John B. Pier-
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pont using the words ''I hereby give and bequeath'' and
under subparagraph FOURTH (b) in creating a similar
trust for his son Thomas G. Pierpont the testator also
used the same words "I hereby give and bequeath."
(R. p. 12)
However, 1n paragraph SEVENTH the testator
omitted use of the word "hereby" where he provided "I
give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate * * * to TRACY-COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY * * *." (R. p. 13)
The use of the word "hereby" can and does have
significant meaning. For example, the language in an act
"that there be, and hereby is, granted" was construed by
the Utah Supreme Court in Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co.,
5 Utah 494, 17 Pac. 631, 633, to mean the grant of legal
title in prcesenti whether the lands included in the grant
were surveyed and selected or not.
Of greater significance in connection with the Pierpont will is the consistent use of the word "hereby" in
each of the paragraphs making specific bequests
and the omission of the word ''hereby'' in the grant of the
residuary estate to Tracy-Collins Trust Company, as
trustee.
Finally, the provisiOns of paragraph SEVENTH
which prescribe and define the power and duties of the
trustee demonstrate the fallacy of the lower court's "finding'' that the trust provisions of the will became effective
at testator's death.

16
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Subparagraph SEVENTH (a) empowers the trustee
to manage, contract with respect to, convey, deal with,
exchange, lease or sell the trust property ''as the Trustee
would have the right to do if it were the individual owner
thereof." Subparagraph SEVENTH (b) empowers it to
vote corporate stock belonging to the trust estate. Subparagraph SEVENTH (d) authorizes it to set up
reserves out of income for taxes and assessments and for
repair of buildings. Subparagraph SEVENTH (g) empowers it to invest and reinvest the trust estate as it
seems "meet and proper." (R. pp. 13-14) Obviously these
powers could not have been exercised by the trustee before distribution of the residual estate to it as the property of testator's estate was in the exclusive possession
and control of the executor until that time. Yet the lower
court found that the trust provisions became effective at
the testator's death. It is unreasonable to say as the lower
court does that the testator intended to confer powers and
duties upon the trustee effective at a time when it was
impossible for the trustee to exercise or discharge them.
The only interpretation that gives meaning and coherency to all the various will provisions mentioned and
analyzed above is that the trust property vested in and
came into the possession of the trustee at the time of the
distribution of the residual estate by the executor and the
trust estate came in to existence and the trust provisions
with respect thereto became effective at that time.
17
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PorNT II.

THE WILL SHOWS AN. INTENTION THAT THE
TESTATOR INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UNTIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO
THE TRUSTEE.
The lower court's ruling that the subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) monthly trust payments commenced at
death is based upon the erroneous conclusion that said
payments are annuities controlled by Section 74-3-14,
U. C. A. 1953, which provides:
"74-3-14. Lega.cies a;n,d Annuities - When
due. - Legacies are due and deliverable at the
expiration of one year after the testator's decease.
Annuities commence at the testator's decease."

Point III below explains the reasons why said payments are not annuities.
The basic question is: "When did the testator intend that the SEVENTH (i) monthly payments would
commence~'' The answer to this question must be founded
on an interpretation of the will.
Said payments are directed to be paid "from the
income of the Trust Estate and, if sufficient, from the
principal thereof." (R. p. 14) The trust estate did not
come into existence until the testator's residual estate was
distributed to the trustee on October 18, 1957. In fact, until
probate was completed and all debts, taxes, expenses and
specific bequests paid, there \Yas no certaint3T that a trust
est:lto would eYen exist. It is cYident that prior to its
18
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creation the trust estate could not have produced income
nor could its principal have been invaded. The trustee,
not the executor, was invested with the duties, powers and
discretions of the trust. The manifest implication from
this is that the payments to respondents under subparagraph SEVENTH (i) were intended to commence on
October 18, 1957, when distribution of the residual estate
occurred, particularly since there is nothing in the will
showing an intention that such payments were to commence at an earlier date.
This interpretation finds support in the provisions
of paragraphs SIXTH and SEVENTH pertaining to
monthly payments to the widow.
Paragraph SIXTH authorizes the payment to the
widow of a $250.00 per month family allowance extending from the date of death until the residual estate" shall
be distributed to my Trustee as provided in Paragraph
SEVENTH hereof.'' (R. p. 13) Paragraph SEVENTH
under which the trust estate vested in the trustee at the
time of the distribution of the residual estate provides for
the payment to the widow of a similar monthly sum, subject to certain expressed conditions, payable from the
income of the trust estate and if insufficient, from the
principal thereof.
It is significant that the monthly payments to be
made from the trust were identical in amount to the authorized family allowance payments. Since the family
allowance payments were to continue until the residual
19
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estate was distributed to the trustee and the trust payments commenced then, the testator thus provided for the
uninterrupted payment of stated amounts to the widow
from the time of his death to the time of the widow's
death subject only to the limitations of paragraph
EIGHTH and subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) and (k).
These provisions read together disclose a carefully devised plan considered adequate by the testator to provide
for the widow's needs. The testator's decision as to the
amounts of these payments doubtless was influenced by
his intimate knowledge of the widow's habits of living
and ability to work, by the size of his estate and the needs
of the other beneficiaries.
Pursuant to these provisions the widow received
$250.00 per month during probate as a family allowance
and since creation of the trust on October 18, 1957, she
has received and is now receiving $250.00 per month
under subparagraph SEVENTH (i) and will continue to
receive same unless and until one of the conditions specified in subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) or (k) occurs. Mrs.
Meyer has received since October 18, 1957, and is now
receiving the sum of $100.00 per month paid in accordance with subparagraph SEVENTH (i).
Neither the appellants nor the other beneficiaries
under the trust question the right of respondents to
retain the payments already made to them or to their
continued right to receive the monthly payments in
accordmwe with said subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) and
(k). Appellants do, howeYer, question the right of re20
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spondents to receive the amounts of $9,282.88 (as to Mrs.
Pierpont) and $3,713.16 (as to Mrs. Meyer) decreed by
the lower court to be due them which amounts are additional to those already received.
As to the widow, the effect of said decree is to give
her a total of $500.00 per month for the period between
the testator's death and the distribution of the residual
estate to the trustee. This is manifestly contrary to the
clear intention of the testator that the payments from
the trust commence as of the date of the distribution of
the residual estate and that the widow receive $250.00 per
month. Furthermore, it creates an unreasonable result
which is unfair and unjust to the other beneficiaries.
The chief asset of the estate was 390 shares of the
capital stock of Provo Foundry and Machine Company,
75 shares of which were transferred to Brigham Young
University during probate in settlement of a dispute (R.
p. 300). The estate had only $8.86 in cash and the property of the state produced a total of only $244.75 in
income during probate of the estate [see first and second
accounts (R. pp. 208-213; 297-305)]. This required the
executor to borrow a total of about $70,000.00 during probate to pay taxes, debts, probate expenses and the family
allowance (R. pp. 208, 297).
In the apparent expectation that sale of the Provo
Foundry stock or liquidation of the company on a reasonable basis might prove difficult due to the nature of
the business and the possible adverse impact upon it of
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the death of its founder and president, the testator provided in paragraph FIFTH that estate assets should not
be sold at a sacrifice ''in order to raise funds to pay cash
bequests made under this Will * * *.'' (R. p. 12) That the
testator anticipated there might be a lengthy probate and
delay in distribution of the residual estate to the trustee
is further indicated by paragraph SIXTH which provided
for the payment to the widow of a family allowance of
$250.00 per month from the date of death "until such time
as my residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee,
as provided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof." (R p.l3)
Paragraphs FIFTH and SIXTH disclose two obvious intentions, first, to preserve and maintain the estate
assets evidenced by testator's instructions that the estate
be not too hastily liquidated even though this course
would delay distribution and second, that the widow receive $250.00 per month from the date of death until distribution of the residual estate to the trustee.
An interpretation that payments under subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) commence as of the date of distribution to
the trustee would harmonize and give effect to both intentions. The interpretation made by the lower court that
SEVENTH (i) payments commence as of the testator's
death is not consistent with either intention, first because
under it delay in liquidating and distributing the estate
while avoiding loss of the estate through a hasty sale
would result in its depletion through duplicate payments
to the widtrw during the period of probate and second
because such interpretation destroys the obvious design
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that the widow receive, either from the estate or the trust,
the sum of $250.00 per month from the date of testator's
death until her death or remarriage.
Reference is made to the attached Enclosure ''A''
which illustrates the unfair and unreasonable effect of
the lower court's interpretation. The amounts decreed
to be due respondents, including principal and interest,
total $14,115.50, which represents 8.91 per cent of the
residual estate of $158,339.22 distributed to the trustee.
If the inability to make a reasonable sale or liquidation
had extended probate for an additional three years or an
additional five years, totals of $26,426.75 and $34,868.75
would be due respondents under the lower court's interpretation, representing respectively 16.69 per cent and
22.02 per cent of the residual estate distributed to the
trustee. These amounts of course are additional to the
monthly $250.00 family allowance paid the widow who
received the total of $8,750.00 as family allowance during probate and who would have received, had probate
been extended for an additional three or five years an
additional $9,000.00 or $15,000.00. Assuming then that probate had been extended until September, 1962, the widow,
under the lower court's interpretation, would be entitled
to receive approximately $24,906.25 plus the $23,750.00
in family allowance she would already have received or
a total of $48,656.25, representing approximately 30 per
cent of the estate distributed to the trustee, all this being
additional to :
(a) The home held in joint tenancy,
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(b) The real property at Vivian Park,
(c) Cash in the joint checking account,
(d) The family automobile,
(e) The furnishings and furniture of the two
homes,
(f) The right to receive $250.00 per month for life
or until remarriage,
(g) The right to receive additional needed amounts
under paragraph SEVENTH (j) (2) of the will
where illness, accident or other causes produces
need.
An interpretation that the testator intended to grant
to the widow, to whom he had been married for less than
four years, this additional large amount to the detriment of his children and grandchildren is not only contrary to the expressed intention but is unreasonable
and unjust This is particularly so where, as is true here,
the interpretation contended for by appellants provides
the widow with an adequate assured monthly income for
life which with the other above enumerated bequests and
benefits to the widow leaves her in a secure and comfortable position enjoyed by few. Furthermore, the lower
court's interpretation is not based upon any language
thnt the testator intended this unreasonable result but
rather upon the erroneous legal conclusion discussed
24
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below that paragraph SEVENTH (i) created- "annuities" which under the statute commence at death.
As to Mrs. Meyer the interpretation urged by appellants is not only consistent with the will provisions
but is reasonable as it assures her a steady monthly
income for life which has been paid since distribution of
the residual estate on October 18, 1957, and which will
continue to be paid.
In arguing, as they do above, that it is unreasonable
to construe the will as the lower court did, appellants do
not wish to be understood as implying or suggesting that
the testator could not have given the widow and Mrs.
Meyer what the lower court says he did or that he could
not have omitted making any provision for his children
and grandchildren if he had elected to do so. Of course,
the testator had the power to dispose of his estate as he
wished. But having in his will manifested a concern over
and an intention to benefit his children and grandchildren,
appellants assert it is unreasonable to interpret the will
as the lower court has done, the effect of which is to give
the respondents a disproportionately large share of the
estate contrary to the expressed intention of the testator
and to the detriment of his children and grandchildren.
PoiNT

III.

THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH
SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE NOT ANNUITIES
AND ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
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The 'lower court found that the bequests made by
subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the will were "in the
nature of annuities" controlled by Section 74-3-14, U.C.A.
1953, and that ''as such annuities said bequests commenced September 14, 1954, the date of the death of said
deceased.'' (R. p. 464)
Based upon that finding the lower court decreed that
respondents were entitled to payments under said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) dating from the death of the
testator.
Appellants urge that the lower court erred in making these findings and decree because (a) the bequests
made by said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not annuities and are not controlled by said Section 74-3-14, U.C.A.
1953~

and (b) in any event the provisions of the testator's

will construed together show an intention that payments
under said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) were not to commence until the distribution of the residual estate to the
trustee.
The Utah Code defines annuities as follows :
(1) Sectio-n 31·-11-2, U. C. A. 1953:

'' * * * Annuities are all agreements to make periodical payments where the making or continuance
of all or some of the series of such payments, or the
amount of any such payment is dependent upon
the continuance of human life, except payments
made under the authority of the previous
parngraph.''
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The payments excepted in the above quotation are
dissimilar to the payments provided by subparagraph

SEVENTH (i).
(2) Section 74-3·-1, U. C.A. 1953:

'' * * * ( 3) An annuity is a bequest of certain specified sums periodically ; if the fund or property out
of which they are payable fails, resort may be
had to the general assets as in case of a general
legacy.''
Three essential elements of an annuity emerge from
the above definitions:

1. The making, continuance or amount of the payments must be dependent upon the continuance of
human life.
2. The payments must be specified and made

periodically.
3. The right to receive or the duty to make the

periodic payments must be certain or sure.
These correspond with the commonly accepted definition of an annuity as being ''a gift of a specific amount
payable periodically, absolutely and generally without
contingency" (see 96 C. J. S. p. 351; Wills § 902)
except that in Utah it is required in addition that the
payments be dependent upon the continuance of human
life.
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Applying these tests, it is obvious that subparagraph
SEVENTH (i) and subparagraph SEVENTH (k)* to
which (i) is expressly made subject, do not create
annuities.
As to the trust provision for Mrs. Pierpont, the making or continuance of payments to her was expressly
conditioned (a) upon her not accepting the alternative
bequest in paragraph EIGHTH and (b) upon her not
remarrying. Had she accepted the bequest made by said
paragraph EIGHTH the payments would never have
commenced and should she remarry the payments will
cease. Having declined to accept the paragraph EIGHTH
bequest, payments to her are not now dependent alone
upon the continuance of human life as Section 31-11-2
requires but upon the continuance of her unmarried
status. Also because payments to the widow will cease
upon her remarriage, the payments to her are not certain
or absolute.

*

"(k) If, at any time the income of the Trust Estate is insufficient to meet the payments required to be made by my Trustee, and
principal funds are not available for such purpose, my Trustee may
proportionately reduce the respective payments to be made to the
extent required by the availability of funds; and, if necessary, may
suspend further payments until funds become available through income of the Trust Estate or through orderly sale of all or part of
the principal assets. In the event any payments specified to be made
by my Trustee shall be so reduced or suspended, it is my desire
that when funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies in
monthly payments shall be made up. It is my desire and instruction
that My Trustee shall not sell principal assets at a sacrifice in order
to obtain funds to meet the payments specified in this Will. But it is
my desire that when, if and as required, principal assets shall be
converted into cash or readilv salable securities in order to enable
the Trustee to make the paynients specified hereunder, provided that
sale of principal assets can, in the sole judg·ment and discretion of
the Trustee, be made at a price and in a manner consistent with sound
business judgment."
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In addition, the provisions of. subparagraph SEVENTH (k) disclose that under some circumstances the
right of the respondents to receive the periodic payments
is not certain and absolute but on the contrary is
uncertain and conditional.
If the income of the trust is insufficient to make the
payments and if there are no principal funds available for
that purpose, the trustee in its discretion can reduce
or even suspend the payments until "funds become available through income of the Trust Estate or through
orderly sale of all or part of the principal assets.'' However, any such a sale is to be made only when the trustee
in its "sole judgment and discretion" determines that
it can be made ''at a price and in a manner consistent
with sound business judgment.'' (R. p. 15) This factor is
important because if subparagraph SEVENTH (i)
created annuities as the lower court ruled, respondents
would be able to force a sale of trust assets to make the
payments if there were no income or principal funds to
pay them with. Woodley v. Woodley, 47 C. A. 2d 358, 117
P. 2d 722, 724 (California 1941), defines as follows the
remedies available to an annuitant to enforce payment:
"The rule is well stated in 2 Am. Jur. p. 833 as
follows: 'In the event of the nonpayment of an
annuity, the old common-law writ of annuity, now
obsolete, was a remedy resorted to by an annuitant
to obtain redress. At the present day, however,
the remedy for nonpayment is, in general, by a personal action of debt or covenant on the instrument
creating the annuity (or in jurisdictions in which
the old forms of action are abolished, a civil action
upon the same theory), or by bill against the
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trustee to compel an account. An annuity which
is a charge on land in the form of a rent charge
is enforceable by distress or an assize, if these
remedies are still available in the particular jurisdiction involved, or a court of equity may
appoint a receiver to collect the rents from such
real estate and apply them to the satisfaction of
a decree in favor of the annuitant; or the person
having the right to the a.rrears is entitled in equity
to have them raised by sale or mortgage of the
estate; and the court will decree accordingly, even
though the person claiming relief is entitled to the
legal remedies of distress and perception of
rents." (Emphasis added)
It is manifest that the testator did not intend to create
annuities so as to put it within the power of respondents
to force a sale of the trust assets. On the contrary he
expressly negatived any idea that annuities had been
created by conferring absolute power and discretion upon
the trustee as to the time when trust assets would be sold.
Furthermore, when income or liquid principal assets
are available after payments have been reduced or suspended, respondents do not have an absolute right that
they be made up. The following provision of subparagraph SEVENTH (k), phrased as it is in language of
desire or request, does not impose a duty on the trustee
to make up reduced or suspended payments but leaves
the matter within its sound discretion:
''In the event any payments specified to be made
by my Trustee shall be so reduced or susp~nded,
it is my desire that when funds become aYmlable,
any so resulting deficiences in monthly payments
shall be made up.'' (Emphasis added) (R. P.15)
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This interpretation is based upon the well-established
rule of will construction that words of desire addressed to
a trustee are generally regarded as precatory, not mandatory, unless a penalty for failure to carry out the testator's wish is imposed. The principle is well stated in the
following quotation from 95 C. J. S., p. 803, Wills § 602
which also distinguishes language of desire directed to
beneficiaries, executors and trustees :
''Distinctions have been drawn between expressions of desire directed to beneficiaries, to executors, and to trustees. A wish directed to a
beneficiary is generally regarded as precatory,
unless the words clearly express the testator's
intention to the contrary; but where the words are
addressed to an executor, they are more often
regarded as mandatory, or at least prima facie
mandatory. Where such words are addressed to a
tnttstee, they are generally regarded as precatory,
unless a penalty for failure to carry out the testator's wish is imposed." (Emphasis added)
This general rule must, of course, yield to any expressed contrary intention of the testator. However, an
examination of the Pierpont will, which obviously was
worded with great care and skill, representing as it does
the carefully thought out instructions of a man trained
through long years of business experience to understand
and appreciate the importance of accurate and explicit
statement, supports the interpretation that the trustee
has the discretion to make up or not make up reduced or
suspended payments. Note the significant change in the
language used in the second and third sentences of subparagraph SEVENTH (k).
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In the second sentence in reference to the making up
of deficiences, the testator said "it is my desire that when
funds become available'' the resulting deficiencies be
made up. In the third sentence which immediately follows, the testator states "it is my desire and instruction
that my Trustee shall not sell principal assets at a sacrifice in order to obtain funds to meet the payments specified in this Will." (Emphasis added) Also in the last
sentence of said subparagraph SEVENTH (k) in reference
to the sale of principal assets, the testator uses only the
precatory words ''it is my desire,'' conferring upon the
trustee discretion with respect to the liquidation of trust
estate assets. But in the first sentence of subparagraph
SEVENTH (l) the testator provides that it is his "desire
and instruction" (emphasis added) that his Provo Canyon home be sold to his son Thomas G. Pierpont for a
specified sum. (R. p. 15)
Had the testator intended that the trustee be required to make up reduced or suspended payments and
not have discretion to make them up or not, he would have
coupled the words "it is my desire" with the words "and
instruction'' as he did in the sentence immediately following and in the first sentence of subparagraph
SEVENTH (1).
There are a number of reasons why the testator
would have \Yanted to confer upon the trustee discretion
in making up or not making up reduced or suspended payments. For example, suppose that existing economic or
other conditions had prevented reasonable liquidation
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of the Provo Foundry and Machine Company stock for
some time after distribution of the residual estate to the
trustee and that there was no income from said stock or
the other trust assets thus requiring a suspension of payments to the respondents. Suppose also that shortly
before liquid assets become available, both respondents
die. If the trustee had no discretion in making up suspended payments under subparagraph SEVENTH (k)
they would be payable, respectively, to the estates of Mrs.
Pierpont and Mrs. Meyer and would pass to their heirs
and legatees and would thus be diverted from the use of
the other trust beneficiaries.
Certainly the testator did not intend that the respondents' heirs would benefit in preference to his children and grandchildren. Such a possibility was avoided
by conferring discretion upon the trustee as to whether
reduced or suspended payments would be made up when
income from the trust or liquid principal assets were
available to the trustee.

In re Pittock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633, 635,
642-643 (Oregon 1921) which involved the interpretation
of precatory language addressed to a trustee has important parallels with the Pierpont will. In that case the following provision of the will of Henry L. Pittock was in
question:
''None of my stock in the Oregonian Publishing
Company shall be sold, but shall be held intact
during the entire period of this trust, I direct that
my trustees shall vote said stock in favor of themselves as directors of said corporation, and it is my
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desire and I request that C. A. Morden shall be
elected manager of the Oregonian and. shall be retained as such, and that Edgar B. Piper shall be
retained as managing editor of the Oregonian
until he shall become incapacitated or until he may
voluntarily resign.''
Decedent's daughter contended that this provision
invalidated the will because it imposed an absolute duty
upon the trustees to vote the stock of the Oregonian Publishing Company in a designated manner, thus creating
a conflict between their duties as directors to the detriment of the latter relation. After discussing numerous
cases, the Oregon court stated :
''Reverting to the Oregonian clause, we find that
the will 'directs ' the trustees to vote the stock in
favor of themselves as directors of said corporation. Immediately the tone of the language
changes, 'and it is my desire and I request,' etc.
If the testator, familiar as he was from his experience as a newspaper man with the use of words
and their shades of meaning, had desired to make
the employment of Morden and Piper imperative,
he most likely would have grouped all those matters under the mandatory word 'direct.' In the immediately preceding cla~se of the will he had declared that 'The trustees shall have full and complete
power and authority over my estate, they
shall have full and complete possession and
control of same.'
Finally in that clause, speaking directly about
shares. of stock, he employed this language:
'They shall ha Ye power to Yote my stock in
the various corporations at all meetings of the
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stockholders of such corporations and shall
have all powers incident to the ownership of
such stock.'
In view of this strong and comprehensive language, the change of his expression immediately
from 'direct' to 'desire' and 'request' is very significant, and we think it is legitimate to construe
the latter clause as merely precatory and advisory,
but not mandatory.''
So here, in view of the strong and comprehensive
language and the change in expression from ''it is my
desire'' to ''it is my desire and instruction,'' the former
clause is merely precatory and advisory, but not
mandatory.
For the above stated reasons appellants assert that
the gifts made by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) cannot
reasonably be interpreted as annuities.
There is a suggestion that the lower court recognized
that said gifts were not in fact annuities. In its finding
No. 4 (R. p. 464) and in paragraph 1 of its judgment
and decree (R. p. 470) it is stated that the bequests made
by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the testator's will
''are in the nature of annuities'' and controlled by Section
74-3-14, U. C. A. 1953. However, that section does not
provide that bequests in the n.ature of annuities commence at the testator's death but only that annuities
commence at that time. For the purpose of determining
whether or not said Section 74-3-i4 is controlling here,
it must be determined whether or not annuities have
been created. If they have not the section is not applic35
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able. Bequests in the nature of annuities are insufficient
to make it applicable.
In any event, saia Section 74-3-14 only raises a presumption that annuities commence at the testator's decease, which presumption under Section 74-3-16 is controlled by the testator's express intention. Appellants
respectfully submit that the provisions of testator's will
analyzed and discussed in Points I and II above show an
express intention that the payments under subparagraph
SEVENTH ( i) were not to commence until the trust
estate had been created by the distribution of the residual estate to the trustee.
But even assuming said bequests are interpreted as
annuities which commenced at testator's death, respondents would have the absolute right only to those payments that accrued betweenAugust 29, 1957, and October
18, 1957. Until August 29, 1957, there was no income
and no principal assets from which the payments could
have been made even had the trustee been in control of
the property which later comprised the trust estate.
Therefore, any payments for the period between the date
of death and August 29, 1957, must be considered as
suspended payments and under subparagraph SEVENTH (k) the question of whether such payments are
to be made up is a matter that lies within the sound
discretion of the trustee.
It is emphasized that the fact that the trustee has
the discretion to make up such suspended payments is not
to be interpreted as in an3- way questioning the rights of
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the respondents to hereafter receive the stated monthly
payments. The assets of the trust estate now consist of
liquid income producing assets of sufficient quantity to
insure that the respondents' monthly payments will hereafter promptly be made and the right of the respondents
to hereafter receive such monthly payments is questioned
by no one.
Attention is called to paragraph 4 of the decree (R.
p. 471) which directs that the sums awarded respondents are to be paid directly to them. In this connection
appellants note that the last sentence of paragraph
NINTH of the will provides :
''Any share of the income or principal of the Trust
Estate shall be payable and deliverable only and
personally to the respective beneficiary entitled
thereto or other legally appointed and acting persons, representatives of such beneficiary, provided
that my Trustee may, in its sole and absolute discretion, make any payment of income or principal
for the benefit of the beneficiary entitled thereto
rather than directly to such beneficiary, if the
Trustee deems this for the best interests of the
beneficiary. ' '
and gives the trustee discretion to make payments to the
beneficiaries either directly or to third parties for the
benefit of the beneficiaries if the trustee in its "absolute
discretion'' so decides.
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PoiNT

IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE AMOUNTS
DECREED TO BE DUE THEM.
The lower court directed that interest be paid torespondents on the sums decreed to be due to them payable ''from the dates that they became due at the rate
of six per cent per annum.'' (R. p. 471)
The award of interest obviously is erroneous if, as
appellants assert, the testator did not intend that payments would commence until the trust was created by the
distribution of the residual estate to the trustee.
In any event, the award is erroneous as to any payments for the period prior to August 29, 1957, since it is
within the discretion of the trustee as to whether any
such payments shall be made up.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that the lower court's
decree should be reversed because the provisions of the
testator's will construed together show (a) that the payments provided by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not
annuities and (b) that the trust was to be created at the
time the residual estate was distributed to the trustee and
that the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments were not
to commence until then.
In any event, the decree should be reversed as to any
payments for the period prior to August 29,1957, because
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the question of whether any such payments are to be
made up lies within the sound discretion of the trustee.
Furthermore, the decree is erroneous in ordering any
direct payments to the respondents since the will gives
the trustee" absolute discretion" as to whether any payments are to be made directly to the trust beneficiaries or
to third parties for their benefit.
Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR
FRANCIS M. GIBBONS
622 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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ENCLOSURE "A"
Payments
for Periods
Ending

10-14-54
11-14-54
12-14-54
1-14-55
2-14-55
3-14-55
4-14-55
5-14-55
6-14-55
7-14-55
8-14-55
9-14-55
10-14-55
11-14-55
12-14-55
1-14-56
2-14-56
3-14-56
4-14-56
5-14-56
6-14-56
7-14-56
8-14-56
9-14-56
10-14-56
11-14-56
12-14-56
1-14-57
2-14-57
3-14-57
4-14-57
5-14-57
6-14-57
7-14-57
8-14-57
9-14-57
10-14-57

Payments
to Mrs.
Pierpont

Payments
to Mrs.
Meyer

$250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
205.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00
250.00

$100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

Cumulative
Total of
Monthly
Payments

350.00
700.00
1,050.00
1,400.00
1,750.00
2,100.00
2,450.00
2,800.00
3,150.00
3,500.00
3,850.00
4,200.00
4,550.00
4,900.00
5,250.00
5,600.00
5,950.00
6,300.00
6,650.00
7,000.00
7,350.00
7,700.00
8,050.00
8,400.00
8,750.00
9,100.00
9,450.00
9,800.00
10,150.00
10,500.00
10,850.00
11,200.00
11,550.00
11,900.00
12,250.00
12,600.00
12,950.00

$

Interest
on Monthly
Payments

$

1.75
3.50
5.25
7.00
8.75
10.50
12.25
14.00
15.75
17.50
19.25
21.00
22.75
24.50
26.25
28.00
29.75
31.50
33.25
35.00
36.75
38.50
40.25
42.00
43.75
45.50
47.25
49.00
50.75
52.50
54.25
56.00
57.75
59.50
61.25
63.00

Cumulative
Total of
Monthly
Payments
Plus Interest

350.00
701.75
1,055.25
1,410.50
1,767.50
2,126.25
2,486.75
2,849.00
3,213.00
3,578.75
3,946.25
4,315.50
4,686.50
5)059.25
5,433.75
5,810.00
6,188.00
6,567.75
6,949.25
7,332.50
7,717.50
8,104.25
8,492.75
8,883.00
9,275.00
9,668.75
10,064.25
10,461.50
10,860.50
11,261.25
11,663.75
12,068.00
12,474.00
12,881.75
13,291.25
13,702.50
14,115.50

Percentage
of Gross
Estate

$

%

2.72

5.61

8.91

Cumulative Total of Payments Extended Through September 14, 1960
9-14-60

250.00

100.00

25,200.00

124.25

26,426.75

16.69

Cumulative Total of Payments Extended Through September 14, 1962
D-14-62

250.00

100.00

33,600.00

40

166.25

34,868.75

22.02
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